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RAINBOW LOVING
JOANNA L. GROSSMAN*
[I would prefer to] see less mixed marriages. But if one doesn’t know
any better than to mess up, let them have it.
—Georgia Governor Lester Maddox, on interracial marriage 1
It’s like in golf . . . . A lot of people—I don’t want this to sound trivial—
but a lot of people are switching to these really long putters, very
unattractive . . . . It’s weird. You see these great players with these
really long putters, because they can’t sink three-footers anymore. And,
I hate it. I am a traditionalist. I have so many fabulous friends who
happen to be gay, but I am a traditionalist.
—Donald Trump, on marriage equality2
We’re a rainbow made of children
We’re an army singing a song
There’s no weapon that can stop us
Rainbow love is much too strong
—Song sung in scout camps across the land3
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INTRODUCTION

Before 1967, there was no recognized right to marry. States had long
been the jealous guardians of marriage law. There had been battles in court
over the meaning of state marriage laws, about how to reconcile conflicting
 Copyright © 2017 by Joanna L. Grossman, Ellen K. Solender Endowed Chair in Women
and the Law and Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law.
1 Court Kills Mixed Marriage Laws, Upholds King Contempt Conviction, ATLANTA
CONST., June 13, 1967, at 1 (quoting Georgia Governor Lester Maddox in the wake of the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Loving v. Virginia).
2 Michael Barbaro, After Roasting, Trump Reacts in Character, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2011,
at A17.
3 LYNN BAKER, A Rainbow Made of Children, on ORIGINAL SOUND TRACK MUSIC FROM
THE MOTION PICTURE “BILLY JACK” (Warner Bros. Records 1971).

60

GROSSMAN-FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

October 2017]

3/22/2018 6:20 PM

RAINBOW LOVING

61

marriage laws across different states, and about whether federal courts had
jurisdiction to weigh in on marriage disputes. But the Supreme Court had
never been asked a simple question: Does the Constitution protect the right
to marry?4
In Loving v. Virginia, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote, for a
unanimous court, that Virginia’s ban on interracial marriage violated both
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.5 The law had been challenged by Richard Loving, a white
man, and Mildred Loving, a woman with African and Cherokee blood.
They were born and raised in Virginia, but fled to neighboring Washington
D.C. to marry in 1958 because their home state barred a variety of racial
pairings, including white/colored.6 The state’s law also prohibited so-called
marriage evasion, leaving one’s home state to contract a prohibited
marriage.7 It was this aspect of the law that the Lovings had violated with
their D.C. marriage. The strong arm of the law was brought to bear on them
when they returned to Virginia and tried to set up house. In an infamous
scene, now depicted on the big screen in the 2016 movie Loving,8 three law
enforcement officers appeared early one morning in the Lovings’ bedroom,
shining a flashlight on them, and demanding of Richard: “What are you
doing in bed with this lady?”9 Richard pointed to the marriage certificate
they had proudly hung on the bedroom wall, but was told by Sheriff R.
Garnett Brooks: “That’s no good here.”10
The Lovings were charged and convicted under the evasion law. They
were sentenced to one year in prison, but the sentence was suspended as
long as the couple agreed to leave Virginia and not return together for
twenty-five years (long enough to outlast their reproductive years,
conveniently). They did relocate to D.C. for a period of time and tried to
build a life there. They had not personally been much interested in civil
rights, but contacted Attorney General Robert Kennedy to ask for help with
this particular, personal situation. He referred them to the ACLU, which
took their case.11 With the ACLU at their backs, they boldly crossed back

4

388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967).
Id. at 1–2.
6 Id. at 2–4.
7 Id. at 4 (excerpting relevant Virginia statutes). Marriage evasion laws played a small but
significant role in marriage law history, peaking after the enactment in 1912 of the Uniform
Marriage Evasion Act. See Joanna L. Grossman, Fear and Loathing in Massachusetts: Same-Sex
Marriage and Some Lessons from the History of Marriage and Divorce, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
87, 103–04 (2004).
8 LOVING (Raindog Films 2016).
9 David Margolick, A Mixed Marriage’s 25th Anniversary of Legality, N.Y. TIMES, June 12,
1992, at B20 (recounting the July 1958 arrest of the Lovings).
10 Id.
11 See Robert A. Pratt, Crossing the Color Line: A Historical Assessment and Personal
5
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over the Potomac River and made their return home known. They then filed
motions to vacate their convictions on federal constitutional grounds.12
The aptly-named Lovings won their gamble. The Supreme Court ruled
in their favor, paving the way for their return home to raise three
multiracial children spared the stigma of illegitimacy. But it was not a sure
bet. Prior to the ruling in this case, the Supreme Court had never articulated
a substantive principle about the right to marry. It had told us, as a side
note, in an 1888 case about the validity of legislative divorce, that marriage
created “the most important relation in life” and had “more to do with the
morals and civilization of a people than any other institution.”13 But in that
same sentence, it reminded us that marriage “has always been subject to the
control of the legislature.”14
I
LOVING AND THE RIGHT TO MARRY

The Supreme Court was no doubt interested in the Loving case
because of the racial implications. The Warren Court was systematically
building a wall against race discrimination, and this presented the
opportunity for placing another significant brick. The Court reached three
important conclusions in its analysis of the Lovings’ claim. First, it rejected
the notion that state power to regulate marriage was unlimited. Although
earlier opinions had spoken broadly of state control, they did so outside of
a federal constitutional challenge. Clearly, the Court wrote in Loving, state
laws must always conform to federal constitutional standards,15 a principle
that had been confirmed in an important parental rights case, Meyer v.
Nebraska,16 and a landmark reproductive rights case, Skinner v.
Oklahoma.17
Second, the Court concluded that Virginia’s miscegenation ban
violated the Equal Protection Clause even though, as Virginia argued, the
statutes “punish equally both the white and the Negro participants in an
interracial marriage.”18 (The rejection of this “equal application” theory of
discrimination would prove relevant and helpful decades later in the fight
Narrative of Loving v. Virginia, 41 HOW. L.J. 229, 237–38 (1998).
12 Loving, 388 U.S. at 3.
13 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
14 Id.
15 388 U.S. at 7 (“[T]he State does not contend in its argument before this Court that its
powers to regulate marriage are unlimited notwithstanding the commands of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Nor could it do so . . . .”).
16 262 U.S. 390, 402–03 (1923) (invalidating state law restricting parents from teaching their
children foreign languages in the home before the eighth grade).
17 316 U.S. 535, 541–43 (1942) (vacating state law mandating that certain classes of habitual
criminals be sterilized).
18 Loving, 388 U.S. at 8.
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for gay marriage equality.) The heart of the equal protection violation,
according to the Court, was that the miscegenation laws, which only
prohibited marriages involving white persons (people of all other races
were free to marry out of their races), were “measures designed to maintain
White Supremacy.”19 (The name of the law, The Racial Integrity Act, says
it all.)20 The race-based classifications were “invidious” and were not
justified by any sufficiently compelling purpose.21
Third, and finally, the Court held that the Virginia ban also violated
the Due Process Clause.22 An unnecessary step, given that the Court had
already identified a sufficient basis for invalidating the challenged statutes,
this aspect of the ruling launched the constitutional right to marry. As the
Court wrote, “[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of
the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men. Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our
very existence and survival.”23 Thus, the Court concluded, “[u]nder our
Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race
resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”24
It was not immediately clear after Loving whether the racial
classification, and the Warren Court’s robust commitment to racial
equality, were the driving forces behind the ruling. But the Court followed
up several times with rulings that reinforced the idea of a constitutional
right to marry, embodied in the concept of privacy under the Fourteenth
Amendment that had also brought us rights related to abortion,
contraception, parenting, and so on.25 In Zablocki v. Redhail, the Supreme
Court invalidated a Wisconsin law that required noncustodial parents with
child support arrearages to get court approval before marrying. 26 The Court
cited Loving in this 1978 case for the principle that marriage is a right “of
fundamental importance” that cannot be directly or substantially infringed
without a compelling justification.27 Any suggestion that Loving was only
about race was put to rest here. Then, in 1987, the Court invalidated a
Missouri prison regulation that permitted inmates to marry only with
permission of the prison superintendent, which was to be granted only for

19

Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 6, 11 n.11.
21 Id. at 11.
22 Id. at 12.
23 Id. (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
24 Id.
25 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (first citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); then citing Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 768–70, 768 n.13 (1977); and then citing
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 460 U.S. 164, 175–76 (1972)).
26 Id. at 374.
27 Id. at 384.
20
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“compelling reasons.”28 The right to marry was deemed so obvious in that
case it was conceded by the State of Missouri; the only question in Turner
v. Safley was whether inmates were part of the group entitled to enjoy the
right (answer: yes).29
Loving ended an era—states could no longer prohibit marriage on the
basis of race—and salvaged the marriage of Richard and Mildred Loving.
Mildred told a reporter “I feel free now . . . it was a great burden.”30
Richard said that the ruling meant that, “[f]or the first time, I could put my
arm around her and publicly call her my wife.”31 According to Richard,
most of his and Mildred’s community had rooted for them to win,32 but that
did not stop the “hostile stares” when they ventured outward. They stood
strong until 1975, when Richard was killed by a drunk driver.33 Mildred
lived until 2008.34
Twenty-five years after the ruling in Loving, the sheriff who had
arrested them remained unapologetic. “I was acting according to the law at
the time,” he told David Margolick of the New York Times in 1992, “and I
still think it should be on the books . . . . I don’t think a white person should
marry a black person. I’m from the old school. The Lord made sparrows
and robins, not to mix with one another.”35 The world, however, had mostly
passed him by. In that quarter-century, attitudes about interracial marriage
had shifted considerably. Behavior was slower to change, but formal
obstacles to mixed-race marriage fell not only in state code books, but also
in other institutions in civil society like churches and workplaces. As
Rachel Moran concludes, while the Court could not “instantly undo the
informal assumptions and practices that developed during three centuries of
a ‘separate but equal’ principle in sex, marriage, and family,” the Court did
give “ordinary Americans the freedom to rethink the role of race in their
intimate relationships.”36 Although there is still evidence of strong samerace preference within most racial groups for dating and marriage,37 there
28

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 82 (1987).
Id. at 95 (“We disagree with petitioners that Zablocki does not apply to prison inmates.”).
30 Helen Dewar, Victor in Mixed Marriage Case Relieved: “I Feel Free Now . . .,” WASH.
POST, June 13, 1967, at A11.
31 Simeon Booker, The Couple that Rocked the Courts, EBONY, Sept. 1967, at 78, 78.
32 See State Couple “Overjoyed” by Ruling, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, June 13, 1967, at
B1 (quoting Richard after the Supreme Court’s decision: “Everyone here really wanted us to win
the case . . . . They were as happy as we were at the decision.”). But see The Crime of Being
Married, LIFE, Mar. 18, 1966, at 82, 85 (“It doesn’t matter to folks around here. They just want to
live and be left alone.”).
33 See Pratt, supra note 11, at 241.
34 See Douglas Martin, Mildred Loving, Who Battled Ban on Mixed-Race Marriage, Dies at
68, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2008, at B7.
35 See Margolick, supra note 9, at B20.
36 RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY 99 (2001).
37 See, e.g., Raymond Fisman et al., Racial Preferences in Dating, 75 REV. ECON. STUD.
29
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has been a steady increase in the United States of the number of individuals
who marry someone of a different race—up to twelve percent in 2013.
Compared to members of other races, whites are the least likely to do so.38
Attitudes change before behavior, and these numbers do reflect increasing
social acceptance of interracial marriage. In 2014, thirty-seven percent of
Americans labeled the increase of intermarriage as a “good thing for
society,” an increase from twenty-four percent only four years earlier.39
II
LOVING AND MARRIAGE BY SAME-SEX COUPLES

But as attitudes and behavior surrounding interracial marriage have
slowly but discernibly evolved, the national conversation moved on to a
new topic: marriage equality for same-sex couples. Mildred Loving
witnessed the change and, although she had generally stopped giving
interviews by that time, she issued a statement on the fortieth anniversary
of the Supreme Court’s ruling in her case “urging that gay men and
lesbians be allowed to marry.”40 By that anniversary in 2007, the fight was
well underway.
After a few false starts in the early 1970s,41 the quest for marriage
equality began in earnest in the early 1990s. Advocates had filed suit in a
variety of states, raising only state-law claims so as to avoid an unfavorable
decision by the U.S. Supreme Court, alleging a constitutional right of
same-sex couples to marry. Loving was front and center in these cases—it
had established that state marriage laws must conform to federal
constitutional norms and identified at least one class of marriages that
could not be prohibited. But what else did it stand for? The first test of its
scope came in Baehr v. Lewin, in which the Hawaii Supreme Court set the
117, 131 (2008) (finding strong racial preferences in dating, even in a “population of relatively
progressive individuals”).
38 See Wendy Wang, Interracial Marriage: Who Is ‘Marrying Out’?, PEW RES. CTR. (June
12,
2015),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/06/12/interracial-marriage-who-ismarrying-out/ (finding that in 2013, seven percent of whites married spouses of a different race,
as compared to nineteen percent of blacks, twenty-eight percent of Asians, and fifty-eight percent
of American Indians).
39 Id.
40 Martin, supra note 34, at B7.
41 Three early cases rejected the argument that bans on same-sex marriage were analogous to
bans on interracial marriage. See, e.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. Ct. App.
1973) (rejecting argument that same-sex marriage ban violated the Federal Constitution); Baker v.
Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971) (same), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972);
Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Wash. 1974) (rejecting analogy to Loving because same-sex
couples are “being denied entry into the marriage relationship because of the recognized
definition of that relationship”). On the history through 2010, see JOANNA L. GROSSMAN &
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY
AMERICA 142–55 (2011).
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stage for the legalization of same-sex marriage in that state.42 In Baehr, the
court read Loving to reject any argument rooted in religious mandates and
dismissed the idea that the “Deity had deemed such a union intrinsically
unnatural.”43 The Virginia trial court had indeed justified its ruling on
religious grounds, explaining the long sentence given to the Lovings in
these terms:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and
he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with
his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact
that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to
mix.44

But in the Hawaii court’s view, the Supreme Court’s reversal of the
conviction also signified a repudiation of this reasoning. The Hawaii
Supreme Court wrote that “we do not believe that trial judges are the
ultimate authorities on the subject of Divine Will, and, as Loving amply
demonstrates, constitutional law may mandate, like it or not, that customs
change with an evolving social order.”45
Baehr was the public debut of the so-called “Loving analogy.” One of
Loving’s significant contributions to the marriage equality fight, though,
was its rejection of the equal application justification for discrimination. In
Baehr, plaintiffs had argued that a ban on marriage by same-sex couples
constituted sex discrimination because men were not allowed to marry
men, but women were; and women were not allowed to marry women, but
men were.46 Classic sex discrimination. The Hawaii court agreed, citing
Loving for support. The Supreme Court in Loving had refused to accept the
argument that the Virginia law was nondiscriminatory because both blacks
and whites were restricted in their choice of marital partners. Substitute sex
for race, the Baehr court reasoned, to yield “the precise case before us
together with the conclusion that we have reached.”47 A ban on marriage by
same-sex couples is sex discrimination, plain and simple, the court
concluded. And, under the Hawaii constitution, sex-based classifications
merit strict scrutiny.48
The ruling in Baehr loomed large over the country, as people began to
hope or fear that when same-sex couples could marry in Hawaii—which
seemed inevitable after the state high court’s ruling, but ultimately never
materialized—they would flood to other states and demand recognition of
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
Id. at 63.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967) (quoting the trial court).
Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63.
See id. at 50.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 63–64.
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their unions. Baehr catalyzed legislators and voters to mobilize in their
opposition to marriage equality. Congress soon would enact the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA), which would refuse recognition to same-sex
marriages for any federal-law purpose, and more than forty states followed
with mini-DOMAs enshrined in their state codebooks, constitutions, or
both.49
In the two decades following Baehr, marriage equality was litigated
everywhere and at every level. In those cases, Loving played many roles.
There were cases that wrestled with the “equal application” argument, as
the court did in Baehr, but the results were mixed.50 Perhaps more
significantly, Loving’s bigger legacy was litigated—how broad was the
right to marry? Despite the Court’s rulings in Zablocki51 and Turner,52
which made clear that even restrictions without a racial component might
violate the right to marry, some courts clung to the racial narrative in
refusing to recognize a right of same-sex couples to marry. The New Jersey
Supreme Court, for example, rejected the same-sex plaintiffs’ reliance on
Loving because “the heart of the case was invidious discrimination based
on race” and the holding was premised on the “fact-specific background of
that case, which dealt with intolerable racial distinctions.”53 The Vermont
Supreme Court refused to see the same “institutionalized racism” in the
exclusion of same-sex couples as it saw in the exclusion of interracial
couples.54 Heteronormativity just doesn’t resonate the way white
supremacy does, perhaps. Courts were also cautious about getting too far
ahead of legislative and public opinion. Miscegenation bans were deeply on
the decline by 1967, while same-sex couples were prohibited from
marrying in every state. This argument of course lost some sway as states
began to legalize same-sex marriage, beginning with Massachusetts in
2004; Connecticut in 2008; Iowa, Vermont, New Hampshire and the
District of Columbia in 2009; and then a cascade of states from 2011 to
2015.55 Although each development on the way to marriage equality for

49 See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104–199, 119 Stat. 2419 (1996). On related
developments, see GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 41, at 147–49.
50 Compare, e.g., Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 989 (Wash. 2006) (holding that
the ban on same-sex marriage creates an illegal sex-based classification) with Standhardt v.
Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. 2003) (same).
51 434 U.S. 374, 387–91 (1978) (striking down a Wisconsin statute which mandated that
individuals with court-ordered child support obligations could not get married without court
approval).
52 482 U.S. 78, 97–100 (1987) (striking down a Missouri statute which prohibited inmates
from marrying each other or civilians without approval from the prison superintendent).
53 Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 210 (N.J. 2006).
54 Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 887 (Vt. 1999).
55 On the developments in chronological order, see Gay Marriage Timeline, PEW RES. CTR.
(Apr. 1, 2008), http://www.pewforum.org/2008/04/01/gay-marriage-timeline/.
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same-sex couples was riveting in real time, their significance in the
historical narrative is eclipsed by the two cases that ended the fight, United
States v. Windsor56 and Obergefell v. Hodges.57
In Windsor, the widow of a same-sex spouse, who had been married in
Canada, sought (and won) a refund of estate taxes that would not have been
owed had the federal government given effect to the couple’s same-sex
marriage.58 Transfers to a legal spouse at death are exempted from the
estate tax, but the IRS denied Windsor’s request for a refund on the
grounds that she was not a “surviving spouse” for estate tax purposes.59 At
the time, New York did not allow for the celebration of valid same-sex
marriages, but it did give effect to those that were validly celebrated
elsewhere.60 Edith Windsor challenged the estate tax assessment on the
ground that the federal-law provision of DOMA was unconstitutional. A
federal district judge ruled in her favor, reasoning that Congress had no
legitimate reason for refusing to recognize marriages based solely on the
sexual orientation of the parties.61 She ordered, without a stay of the
judgment, that the Internal Revenue Service refund over $350,000 to the
decedent spouse’s estate.62
The ruling was appealed to the Second Circuit, but before a decision
came from that court, both parties petitioned for certiorari before judgment,
asking the Supreme Court to take the case immediately.63 While the petition
was pending, the Second Circuit issued its ruling.64 It affirmed the trial
court’s ruling in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that sexual orientation
classifications merit heightened scrutiny and that the government did not
have sufficiently good reasons for this one.65
The question presented by the petitioner to the Supreme Court was
this: “Whether Section 3 of DOMA violates the Fifth Amendment’s
guarantee of equal protection of the laws as applied to persons of the same
sex who are legally married under the laws of their State.”66 In its order
granting review, the Supreme Court asked the parties to brief and argue not
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (finding that DOMA’s definition of marriage unconstitutional).
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2588 (2015) (finding that same-sex marriage is a constitutionally
protected right).
58 133 S. Ct. at 2682.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 2683. Subsequently, the New York legislature passed a law to legalize same-sex
marriage. See Marriage Equality Act, ch. 95, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 749 (McKinney).
61 Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“With no other
rational basis to support it, Congress’s interest in economy does not suffice.”).
62 Id.
63 Windsor, 135 S. Ct. at 2684.
64 Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012).
65 Id. at 181–88.
66 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment, United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307,
2012 WL 3991414 (Sept. 11, 2012).
56
57
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only the question presented, but also the question whether the Bipartisan
Legal Advisory Group, which stepped in when the Department of Justice
ceased defending DOMA in court because of its determination that the
provision was unconstitutional, had standing to defend DOMA in court.67
In the opinion on the merits, the Supreme Court invalidated the federal-law
provision of the Defense of Marriage Act on equal protection grounds.68
Loving was cited only once in Windsor for the very certain proposition that
although marriage laws have “long been regarded as a virtually exclusive
province of the States,” state laws defining and regulating marriage must
conform to federal constitutional standards.69 But this was offered not only
as a truism that bears repeating, but also as a set up for the Court’s
determination that Congress’s decision to categorically exempt one type of
marriage from every type of benefit and obligation was inconsistent with its
past behavior. Indeed, most federal laws and programs defer to state-law
determinations of marital and parent-child status, even when allocating
significant benefits and burdens, such as Social Security benefits and taxes.
Given the federal government’s usual practices, its sudden refusal to give
effect to one class of marriage for every purpose was a discrimination of an
“unusual character” that raised an inference of animus, a motivation the
Court had determined in a previous case was not sufficient to survive even
the lowest form of judicial scrutiny.70 The Court rejected Congress’s
ostensible motivations for the law as either false or insufficient, and it
struck the law down. Justice Scalia, in a strongly worded dissent, predicted
that Windsor would certainly give way to a full-blown right of marriage
equality.71 Just two years later, his prediction came to pass.
As one might expect, Loving played a much more significant role in
Obergefell v. Hodges, in which the scope of the constitutional right to
marry, first recognized in Loving, was front and center. But the pathway
from Loving to Obergefell included one very important stop: Lawrence v.
Texas.72 In that case, the Court held that a state law criminalizing same-sex
sodomy ran afoul of the right of privacy protected in the substantive
component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Two men
were arrested after the police, dispatched on a report of a weapons
disturbance, encountered them in their apartment engaged in a sexual act.

67

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 786, 787 (2012) (granting certiorari).
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013).
69 Id. at 2691 (internal citation omitted).
70 Id. at 2692 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)).
71 The hand-wringing conclusion of his dissent expressed deep skepticism “that a
constitutional requirement to give formal recognition to same-sex marriage is not at issue here . . .
. I promise you this: The only thing that will ‘confine’ the Court’s holding is its sense of what it
can get away with.” Id. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
68
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They were convicted under a Texas law criminalizing “deviate sexual
intercourse with another individual of the same sex.”73 By a 6–3 majority,
the Court, in a majority opinion authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy,
invalidated the law—and all anti-sodomy laws, even those that apply to
both same-sex and opposite-sex couples. The Court never expressly labeled
the conduct at issue a “fundamental” right, but it spoke in language we
associate with such rights. It wrote broadly about a sphere of privacy broad
enough to include choices about intimate relationships and physical
expressions that arose from them. Two aspects of Lawrence were essential
in paving the way for the Obergefell opinion thirteen years later. First was
the Court’s discussion of fundamental rights analysis, in which it observed
that “[h]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the
ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.”74 This would have
obvious implications in the marriage equality context when arguing for
recognition of a right that, in that particular iteration, had never before been
granted. Second, the Court dispensed with the notion that moral
disapproval, without more, could constitutionally justify the state’s
infringement of an important liberty interest.75 This would also be
important in the later battle, particularly as the standard governmental
defenses of same-sex marriage bans seemed to get less and less traction in
court.
James Obergefell and John Arthur, a gay couple who had been
together for over two decades, made only a modest request of their home
state of Ohio. They wanted their marriage to be acknowledged on Arthur’s
death certificate. Arthur was suffering with end-stage ALS (Lou Gehrig’s
Disease), a progressive and fatal illness, but the couple wanted to marry
before he died. They flew from Ohio, which did not allow same-sex
couples to marry, to Maryland, which did, on a medical transport plane.
Because it was too difficult to move Arthur given his debilitating illness,
the marriage was solemnized in a ceremony on the plane as it sat on the
tarmac. Arthur died, as expected, just three months later.76 Ohio law did not
permit recognition of a marriage by a same-sex couple for any reason,
including for vital statistics records. Obergefell sued, arguing that Ohio’s
refusal to give effect to a validly celebrated marriage from Maryland
violated his equal protection and due process rights under the Federal
Constitution. A federal district court sided with Obergefell, ordering Ohio
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Id. at 563.
Id. at 572 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy,
J., concurring)).
75 Id. at 559 (stating that “this Court’s obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate
its own moral code”).
76 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594–95 (2015).
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to record Arthur’s status at death as “married.”77 But the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the decision whether
to allow or disallow marriages by same-sex couples was reserved to the
states.78
The appellate court reversed all trial court rulings in cases from other
states within its jurisdiction. It found no constitutional problem with a
Michigan law that prevented a lesbian couple from jointly adopting a
special needs child because their out-of-state marriage could not be
recognized there.79 Nor with Tennessee’s refusal to recognize the valid
New York marriage of an Army reservist who settled there with his
husband after a year’s deployment to Afghanistan.80 Nor, finally, with the
denial of a marriage license to a Kentucky couple with thirty-one years
under their relationship belt and two teenage children.81 These cases
involved sixteen couples (two with only a surviving partner) who had been
denied either the right to marry in a state within the Sixth Circuit, or the
right to have an out-of-state marriage recognized, or both. Although the
Sixth Circuit reversed all the district court rulings in its jurisdictions, every
other federal appellate court facing a similar challenge did the opposite—
they struck down state bans on the celebration and recognition of same-sex
marriage.82
At stake in Obergefell was the constitutional validity of the bans all
over the country that denied same-sex couples the right to marry and the
right to have otherwise valid marriages recognized. The Court looked to
Loving as the Court’s first and clearest statement that “the right to marry is
protected by the Constitution”83—indeed, in the Loving Court’s words,
marriage is “one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men.”84 It then looked to Loving as one of the more
“instructive precedents” that allowed the Court to sidestep Baker v. Nelson,
where, in 1972, it had dismissed the writ of certiorari in a same-sex
marriage case “for want of a substantial federal question.”85 Baker had
lurked in the background of marriage equality litigation, perhaps standing
for the proposition that the Supreme Court had already ruled on the merits
of the question presented in Obergefell. But the Court this time around was
77

Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968 (S.D. Ohio 2013).
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 421 (6th Cir. 2014).
79 DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014).
80 Tanco v. Haslam, 7 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. Tenn. 2014).
81 Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542 (W.D. Ky. 2014).
82 See Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 119 (10th Cir. 2014); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352
(4th Cir. 2014); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th
Cir. 2014).
83 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).
84 Id. (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)).
85 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972).
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dismissive of Baker as one of the “assumptions defined by the world and
time of which it is a part.”86 Baker was contrasted with Loving, which
“identified essential attributes of [the right to marry] based in history,
tradition, and other constitutional liberties inherent in this intimate bond.”87
It helped the Court understand why the right to marry is protected in the
first place. Loving, according to the Obergefell court, established the
“abiding connection between marriage and liberty.”88 “[D]ecisions
concerning marriage are among the most intimate that an individual can
make.”89 Moreover, Loving helped establish that the freedom to marry
“resides with the individual” and that there is dignity in the bond between
any two people as well as in the autonomy to “make such profound
choices.”90
Loving was important to refuting a key argument by the State of Ohio,
which was trying to defend its ban. Ohio suggested that the Court needed to
engage in so-called Glucksberg analysis, the process for determining
whether a new right is indeed fundamental and deserving of constitutional
protection.91 This analysis was defined in Washington v. Glucksberg, a case
in which the Court was asked to consider whether individuals have a right
to physician-assisted suicide.92 But the Obergefell Court beat back this
suggestion, concluding that the plaintiffs were not seeking recognition of a
new right any more than the plaintiffs in Loving were seeking a new “right
to interracial marriage.”93 In 1967 and in 2015, the question was whether
there was “sufficient justification for excluding the relevant class” from an
already-established right.94
Finally, Loving was relevant to the Obergefell Court’s understanding
of the interconnected relationship between the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses. The Loving Court could have stopped its opinion after
invalidating Virginia’s miscegenation ban on equal protection grounds. But
it continued with a full and independent analysis of the law’s validity under
the Due Process Clause, a move that arguably led to the robust protection
for the right to marry that would follow.95 With both liberty and equality at
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Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598.
Id.
88 Id. at 2599.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 See id. at 2602 (“[R]espondents refer to Washington v. Glucksberg . . . which called for a
‘careful description’ of fundamental rights.” (citation omitted) (quoting Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 724 (1997))).
92 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 704–05.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 See id. at 2603–05 (discussing the important implications of the Loving Court’s due
process analysis).
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stake, the right to marry must be jealously guarded.
In the end, the Obergefell Court held that states cannot deny same-sex
couples the right to marry without running afoul of the Fourteenth
Amendment.96 Almost fifty years after the ruling in Loving v. Virginia, and
at a very different social time, the opinion began broadly and poetically—
or language better reserved, as Justice Scalia suggested in a biting dissent,
for a fortune cookie. “The Constitution,” it opened, “promises liberty to all
within its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific rights that allow
persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their identity.”97 This
sentence left no mystery as to the outcome of the case and established the
tone and substance of the opinion that followed.
Thus, Justice Kennedy did for gay couples what Chief Justice Warren
did for interracial couples: He recognized their humanity and their right,
rooted in liberty and equality, to partake in this most essential of
institutions. He let the rainbow loving begin.
The pathway from Loving to Obergefell is indisputable, but Loving did
more than just open the door to marriage equality. Prior to Loving, there
were only a handful of cases, mostly involving attempted intrusions into
parental autonomy, in which the Supreme Court considered overriding a
state law regarding family status or operation based on constitutional
constraints.98 But the body of constitutional family law grew dramatically
beginning in the 1970s, an arc triggered in part by the Supreme Court’s
intervention into Virginia marriage law in Loving. According to Professor
Pamela Karlan, “Loving is seen today as a critical point in the revival of
substantive due process.”99 The number of specific rights recognized as
falling within that sphere increased significantly in the two decades after
Loving was decided.100
CONCLUSION

There is now a lengthy patchwork of cases cited for the principle that
individuals have “the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances,
from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy,” 101 and Loving
96

Id. at 2604–05.
Id. at 2593.
98 See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (affirming, against Fourteenth
Amendment challenge, a parent’s conviction for violating child labor laws by using a child to
distribute religious pamphlets); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating, on due
process grounds, a statute that banned the teaching of foreign languages to children who had not
passed the eighth grade).
99 Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1447, 1463 n.7 (2004).
100 See id. at 1456 (“The Court’s decisions in Griswold, Eisenstadt v. Baird, and Roe had
dramatically expanded constitutionally protected autonomy.”).
101 Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 439 U.S. 1052, 1055 (1987) (denying certiorari)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing, for example, Loving, Zablocki, Skinner v. Oklahoma, Meyer,
97
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is virtually always amongst those cited. Loving thus provides support for
the right to not marry as well as the right to marry, and the related rights to
make decisions over a “broad range of private choices involving family life
and personal autonomy.”102 The Supreme Court includes Loving among the
litany of cases collectively establishing the contours of the right to privacy:
“Choices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are
among associational rights this Court has ranked as ‘of basic importance in
our society,’ rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment against the
State’s unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect.”103
Perhaps the Supreme Court has closed the loop now on fundamental
rights. The future is impossible to predict. But the past is the past, and we
know the role that Loving played in shaping it. Objections to marriages of
same-sex couples were as strong, if not stronger, that those of interracial
couples. Whether the objections spoke of robins and sparrows, or strange
metaphors about the length of golf putters, they were deeply held and hard
fought. But in both cases, the arc of history bent towards justice—and
marriage equality for all. The Obergefell marriage lasted only a short time,
but it will play a lasting role in history, just as the Loving marriage did.
As Jim Obergefell wrote on the day the decision was handed down,
“[m]y husband John died 20 months ago, so we’re unable to celebrate
together the Supreme Court’s decision on the case that bears my name,
Obergefell v. Hodges. . . . America has taken one more step toward the
promise of equality enshrined in our Constitution, and I’m humbled to be
part of that.”104

Moore, Pierce, etc., to invalidate a public employer’s prohibition on unmarried employees’ living
together in an intimate relationship).
102 Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 464 U.S. 965 (1983) (denying certiorari) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(considering validity of police department’s antinepotism policy as applied to a nonmarried
couple); see also Robert A. Destro, Introduction: Law and the Politics of Marriage: Loving v.
Virginia After 30 Years, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1207, 1218 (1998) (noting Loving’s support for
“federal oversight of State power to define, regulate, and order sexual, marital, and family
relationships”).
103 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996) (citation omitted) (invalidating a Mississippi
statute requiring a woman to prepay record preparation fees in order to appeal an order
terminating her parental rights). Loving is cited in many pivotal privacy cases. See Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 132 (1989) (upholding conclusive presumption of husband’s paternity
over constitutional challenge from child’s biological father); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312
n.18 (1980) (refusing to extend the right to privacy to include a right to Medicaid reimbursement
for a medically necessary abortion); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977)
(striking down New York ban on distribution of non-prescription contraceptives); Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (invalidating zoning ordinance that distinguished
between nuclear and non-nuclear families for purposes of residential restrictions).
104 Jim
Obergefell,
My
Husband,
MEDIUM
(June
26,
2015),
https://medium.com/@ObamaWhiteHouse/my-husband-69362c9d63df#.kf4nnsvhv.

